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RELIGION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT
OF 1978
Robin K. Rannow*
The first amendment of the United States Constitution guaran-
tees the free exercise of religion,' but this guarantee is not ab-
solute.2 The courts have repeatedly distinguished between
religious beliefs, which are absolutely protected under the free ex-
ercise clause, and religious practices, which are not.' The govern-
ment is empowered to limit certain practices and activities if it
can establish a state interest of sufficient magnitude to justify the
infringement and thereby override the interests claiming protec-
tion under the free exercise clause.' The courts require more than
mere assertions of a state interest to override first amendment
protections.'
The often close relationship of religious beliefs to conduct
make the task of analyzing first amendment claims even more dif-
ficult and delicate. Practices and activities claiming first amend-
ment protection must be based uponxeligious beliefs in order to
justify that protection.
In theory, the first amendment guarantees extend to all
religions. The first amendment was framed in such a way as to
guarantee the widest exercise of religion with no religion being
singled out for preferential treatment." Conversely, then, no one
religion should be singled out for less than equal consideration of
first amendment protections. Any governmental action that either
* Third year law student, Catholic University School of Law, Washington, D.C.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
3. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
4. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Badoni v. Broadbent, 452 U.S. 954 (1980) (dam and reservoir that were part of a multi-
state water storage and power generation project outweighed religious interests asserted
by Navajos in prayer spot to be flooded by lake); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878) (Mormon religious practice of polygamy outweighed by state interest in morals and
well-being of its practitioners).
Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state's strong interest in providing
secondary education insufficient to override Amish religious beliefs where exemption
possible to accommodate both interests).
5. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
6. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
7. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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advances or inhibits a particular religion risks violation of the
establishment clause of the first amendment.8
The first amendment protects the religious beliefs and practices
of Native Americans to the same extent it does all other religions.
In practice, however, there have been repeated enactments and
enforcements of numerous federal statutes and regulations that
have seriously restricted the traditional religious rights of Native
Americans." Many of these laws advance such worthwhile goals
as preserving wilderness areas and protecting wildlife. The Bald
Eagle Protection Act, 10 for example, provides criminal sanctions
for the unlawful taking, killing, or other prohibited use of bald
eagles. This law, although not intended directly to affect Native
American religions, was eventually amended to permit the use of
eagle feathers essential to certain Native American religious
ceremonies. "
Government policies have a long and pitiful history of sup-
pressing traditional Native American religious rights, even to the
point of actively forcing Native Americans to abandon their
traditional customs and religions. A clear example of this was the
assimilationist policies of the Bureau of Indian Affairs' boarding
schools which endeavored to "save" the children by destroying
their identities as Indians. 2
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. 123 CONG. REC. 539300 (Dec. 15, 1977), where Senator Abourezk, chairman of
the Senate Select Committee in Indian Affairs and sponsor of the Senate Resolution, cited
these federal infringements on Native American religious freedoms.
See also H. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. 1308]; U.S. FEDERAL AGENCIES TASK FORCE REPORT, AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM ACT (1979) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT] (citing specific instances
of government infringements that repressed traditional Native American religions as being
"common practice").
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1940) (providing criminal sanctions for unlawful taking,
killing, or other use of eagles).
11. See Endangered Species Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-42 (Supp. III
1973) (to preserve and protect threatened and endangered species). See also National
Wildlife Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1964) (to set aside and protect wilderness
areas for protection and enjoyment of wildlife); National Historical Preservation Act, 16
U.S.C. § 470 (1966) (to preserve and protect designated historical sites).
12. See New Rider v. Board of Educ. of Indep. School Dist. No. 1, 480 F.2d 693
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973) (Douglas, J., strongly dissenting to denying
certiorari where such substantial constitutional issues are involved). The case concerned
the suspension of three Indian students for failing to comply with the school's hair-length
regulation. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of plaintiffs' suit on
the basis that the regulation was neutral on its face and as applied. The court went on to
say that the constitutional claims (free speech and the free exercise of religion) were in-
significant where the regulation can be shown to have a rational relation to legitimate
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Whether intended or not, infringements often resulted from
beliefs and attitudes of non-Indians who questioned whether tra-
ditional Native American religions were truly "religious." Ig-
norance, suspicion, insensitivity, and neglect have been translated
into attitudes effectively granting Native American religions less
than equal consideration and protection under the first amend-
ment.13 These religious and cultural biases held by non-Indians
have been reflected in both legislative enactments and judicial
decisions. There is a need to extend the understanding and respect
afforded the other differing religious beliefs practiced in this na-
tion to the traditional religious beliefs of Native Americans.
Congress addressed this need in the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978.14 There had been no consistent federal
policy about Indian religions, caused, in many instances, by
unawareness of the nature of traditional Native American reli-
gious practices. The result was the failure to accord these prac-
tices the same status as "real" religions. 5 The purpose of the Act
is "to insure that the policies and procedures of various Federal
agencies, as they may impact upon the exercise of traditional In-
dian religious practices, are brought into compliance with the
constitutional injunction that Congress shall make no laws
abridging the free exercise of religion."' 6
The preamble of the Act recognizes the "inherent right" of
Native Americans freely to exercise their religion. The preamble
also identifies instances in which this right has been abridged
under a variety of federal laws without considering their effect on
Native American religions. The Act then declares that it is the
sense of Congress that
state interests. While the court discussed mostly the free speech implications, it suggested
that it couldn't assume the responsibility of determining whether the students' religious
beliefs were sincere.
Compare Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975), a similar case in which the
court did consider the sincerity of religious beliefs as they applied to the wearing of long
braids. The court found the prison's hair-length regulation impermissibly infringed on In-
dian plaintiff's religious beliefs.
13. A widely known example of the drastic results of fear and misunderstanding of
Native American religions was the Wounded Knee Massacre in 1890, in which soldiers
killed almost three hundred men, women, and children performing the Ghost Dance. This
dance was simply a part of a nonviolent religious movement that prophesied a new and
better world for the Indians. D. BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1971).
14. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469, 42
U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. I1 1979).
15. H.R. REP. No. 1308, supra note 9, at 4.
16. Id. at 1.
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it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and
preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom
to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the
American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, in-
cluding but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of
sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremo-
nials and traditional rites. 17
The Act identified infringements by the federal government of
native religions and divided them into three general areas: denials
of access to certain physical locations (analogous to denying a
person entrance into his church or temple), restrictions on the use
of substances that have religious significance and that are
necessary to perform the rites of the religion (such as peyote),
and actual interference in religious events (even if only caused by
simple curiosity), including ceremonies requiring strict isolation. 8
Hopi Tribe v. Block identified three duties federal agencies
must comply with, under the Act, in formulating new regulations
and procedures: evaluate their policies and procedures with the
goal of protecting Indian religious freedoms; refrain from pro-
hibiting access, possession, and use of religious objects and the
performance of religious ceremonies; and consult with Indian
groups in regard to any proposed actions. In Hopi Tribe, the
Hopi and Navajo plaintiffs made both constitutional and statu-
tory challenges to an authorization by the Department of Agri-
culture to expand the Arizona Snow Bowl, a recreational facility
located in the area of the San Francisco Peaks. The Peaks are of
special significance to both tribes' religions."0 The Indian plain-
tiffs sought to prevent further expansion, and also to secure
removal of the existing facilities, claiming that operation violated
their first amendment guarantees in the free exercise of religion
because of the sacred nature of the mountains.
The court granted the government's request to bar the plain-
tiffs' claim for removal based on laches. 2' The court further re-
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1996(1). See text of Act in Stambor, Manifest Destiny and American
Indian Religious Freedom: Sequoyah, Badoni, and the Drowned Gods, this issue.
18. H.R. REP. No. 1308, supra note 9, at 3.
19. No. 81-0481, 8 I.L.R. 3073 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981), aff'd, No. 81-1912 (D.C.
Cir. May 20, 1983). Plaintiffs' bases for relief were the first amendment free exercise
clause, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, breach of a fiduciary duty owed, the
National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act, Administrative Procedure Act, and the National Historical Preservation Act.
20. 8 I.L.R. at 3074.
21. Id. at 3074, 3079.
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jected plaintiffs' request to enjoin further development under
separate analyses of the first amendment and Religious Freedom
Act claims.22
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act does not require
that Native American religious considerations always prevail.
This would risk violating the establishment clause of the first
amendment. In light of the Act, however, the court failed to give
the Native American religious beliefs asserted their proper con-
sideration and protection within the balancing test of the first
amendment free exercise clause.
The First Amendment Right
In determining whether state action impermissibly infringes
upon protected first amendment free exercise rights, the courts
apply a two-step analysis. It must first be determined if the action
actually places a burden on the free exercise of religious rights
protected. Upon finding such an infringement, the court then
balances these first amendment rights with the interests the
government asserts to justify that infringement.23
The application of this two-step process has resulted in incon-
sistent interpretations and holdings in regard to traditional Native
American religions.24 In Sequoyah v. TVA, the Sixth Circuit ap-
peared to apply this two-step process in a challenge by Cherokee
plaintiffs to the flooding of the Little Tennessee Valley that
asserted the sacred nature of the land. 21 Plaintiffs' claim included
relief under the first amendment free exercise clause and the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act. The court found that
plaintiffs failed to meet the first part of the test because the in-
22. Id. at 3074-76.
23. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d
1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394
P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
24. But see Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980), in which Na-
vajo plaintiffs claimed that the government's management of a multistate dam and reser-
voir project impermissibly infringed upon the free exercise of plaintiffs' religion. The
flooding covered a prayer spot that plaintiffs asserted was sacred to them. The Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the lower court's finding that the governmental interests outweighed the
religious interests of the plaintiffs. In finding the government's interest compelling under
the second step of the first amendment test, the question of whether such action involved
an infringement on plaintiffs' free exercise rights (the first step of the test) was not
reached. There are possible implications with respect to the courts' power to review the
ultimate constitutionality of the government's actions when the test, although articulated
correctly, is applied in reverse.
25. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
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terests at stake were cultural rather than religious.2 6 The court,
however, found infringements would be justified by Congress'
authorization to the Tennessee Valley Authority to construct the
Tellico Dam notwithstanding "any other law. ' 27 Regardless of
the court's interpretation of this statutory language, no mention
was made about the power of the court to declare the language in
conflict with the Constitution.
Two problems clearly surface in the application of this test to
Native American free exercise claims. First, the lack of a clear
definition of what is "religion" and "religious" is especially
critical when dealing with traditional Native American religions
that are so different from the recognized major world religions.
When the religion itself is difficult to recognize, an added prob-
lem is the proper weight to be given it when balanced with the
purported state interests justifying the infringement.
There is authority that the courts lack the power to decide what
a religion is.2" Such power, it is argued, would permit a court to
adopt an informal state religion, a violation of the establishment
clause. However, the Supreme Court has been willing to define
what constitutes "religious beliefs" entitled to first amendment
protection. 9 An essential part of this analysis requires considera-
tion of the nature of the religious practice or right asserted and its
relationship to those protected beliefs.3 0 Understanding this rela-
tionship is essential to assure that proper weight is given when re-
ligious conduct is balanced against governmental interests, rather
than beliefs alone.
Courts have defined this relationship in different terms.
Greater weight is given to those practices and rituals that play a
26. Id. at 1164-65.
27. Id. at 1161 (congressional authorization in language of Energy and Water De-
velopmental Appropriations Bill, Pub. L. No. 96-69).
28. Kolbeck v. Kramer, 84 N.J. Super. 569, 202 A.2d 889 (1964).
29. In reversing peyote possession convictions under a state dangerous drugs statute,
the California Supreme Court determined that the history of the Native American Church
and peyotism supported the Indian defendant's defense under the first amendment. The
ceremonial use of peyote by members of the church was found to be central to the exer-
cise of those religious beliefs. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727, 394 P.2d 813, 821,
40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77 (1964).
For an in-depth analysis of the Amish religion's history to determine that the state's
compulsory education law infringed upon the beliefs of the Amish respondents, see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
30. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of application of appellant
for unemployment compensation because she refused to work on Saturday was a viola-




"central role" to or are a "cornerstone" of the exercise of the
particular religion. 3' While "absolute necessity" is stricter than
the first amendment balancing test requires, greater weight is
given to practices that are more essential to the exercise of pro-
tected religious beliefs.
Regardless of how important the practice or ritual is to exercis-
ing one's religious beliefs, it must be rooted in the claimant's
religion.3 2 Although a court cannot inquire into the veracity of
the religion itself, it will look closely at the bona fides of the
asserted religious beliefs.
33
A very real problem for Indian tribal plaintiffs is that the
courts, in determining what constitutes a sincerely held religious
belief, are accustomed to applying first amendment protections in
terms of Christian-Judeo religions. Traditional Native American
religions are not organized in the same way. The churches or
temples, the clergy, the regular meetings, and the sacred writings
that symbolize many recognized world religions are generally not
characteristic of Native American religions. Different methods of
exercising one's religious beliefs should not make them auto-
matically suspect in the eyes of the law and thereby unprotected
by the first amendment.34 It is also important to be aware that
although some similarities exist, there are many native religions,
not merely one. 35 The variety in the methods of worship by the
different tribes and clans should not detract from their authen-
ticity. These differences have made it sometimes impossible for
non-Indians, including those in branches of the government, to
perceive them as being "real." 36
31. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 165-66 (1878); Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068,
1071-72 (Alaska 1979) (use of moose meat the "cornerstone" of funeral potlatch
ceremony deeply rooted in religious beliefs of Athabascans); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d
716, 720, 394 P.2d 813, 817, 821, 40 Cal Rptr. 69, 73, 77 (1964) (ceremonial use of peyote
plays "central role" in religion and goes to "essence" of religious expression).
32. See, e.g., Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1072-73 (Alaska 1979).
33. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963); Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979); People v. Woody, 61 Cal.
2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
34. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Ballard, concluded that it was forbidden
to inquire into the genuineness of the "I Am" religious beliefs asserted. However, the
jury was properly instructed, in the lower court, to determine whether those beliefs were
sincerely held. 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) ("Man's relation to his God was made no concern
of the state. He was granted the right to worship as he pleased and to answer to no man
for the verity of his religious views.").
35. See generally J. HuRDY, AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIONS (1970); R. UNDERHILL, RED
MAN'S RELIGIONS (1965); READER IN COMPARATIVE RELIGION: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL AP-
PROACH (W. Less & E. Vogt eds. 1974).
36. H.R. REP. No. 1308, supra note 9, at 4.
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In some cases, courts have been able to recognize the unique-
ness of native religions. The clearest example is the series of cases
recognizing the right of Native American Church members to use
peyote in religious ceremonies. The leading case, People v.
Woody," reversed a peyote possession conviction because the
statute impermissibly infringed upon Native American Church
members' free exercise of religion. The court applied the first
amendment two-step analysis, determining that the ceremonial
use of peyote was permissible for bona fide religious purposes."
Not all traditional Native American religions are as readily
recognizable as the Native American Church, which has some of
the trappings of an organized religion.
A number of factors have been repeatedly considered by the
courts to assist in determining whether an asserted religious prac-
tice or activity is based upon a bona fide religious belief. The
Supreme Court, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,19 described and applied
many of the factors courts have consistently used in determining
whether the religious beliefs asserted were sincerely held by the
parties. At issue was a conviction of members of the Amish reli-
gion for violating the state's compulsory education law when they
refused to allow their children to attend school beyond eighth
grade. The Court held that the law violated the free exercise of
the Amish religion notwithstanding the reasonable and important
social interests asserted by the state in enforcing the law. 40 The
Court closely examined the history of the religion, its relationship
to its believers' way of life, and how important those beliefs were
to the continued survival of the religion. In addition, the Court
relied on the testimony of experts in the court below for
enlightenment concerning the rituals and tenets of the religion.2
When considering the governmental interests advanced to jus-
tify infringements, courts have looked to the possibility of less
burdensome alternatives to meet those legitimate interests.42
37. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal Rptr. 69 (1964).
38. 61 Cal. 2d at 721, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal Rptr. at 76.
39. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
40. Id. See also Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980) (experts testified as
to the history and nature of Cherokee beliefs regarding the area at issue as the birthplace
and capital of the religion); Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (testimony by
anthropological experts on the nature of the Athabascans' religion and the role of moose
meat in the funeral potlatch ceremony).
41. 406 U.S. at 210.
42. In supporting the creation of an exemption for the Amish from the state's com-
pulsory education law to accommodate their religious beliefs, such an accommodation
could be permitted without constituting government sponsorship or active involvement in
[Vol. 10
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While aware of the danger of acting contrary to the establishment
clause, courts have upheld exceptions to protect the important
values embodied in the first amendment free exercise clause.43
Scope of the Act and Hopi v. Block
In enacting the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Con-
gress clearly recognized that despite the protections of the first
amendment to the free exercise of all religions, the religious
freedoms of Native Americans have not received the same con-
sideration and protection. The Act was passed as a remedial mea-
sure to correct the past history of little or no recognition of tradi-
tional Native American religious practices.
The scope of the Act, however, is limited. While infringements
come from many sources, this act applies only to federal agencies
and related activities." The Act's purpose is to ensure that
policies and actions of federal agencies potentially affecting the
religious practices of Native Americans comply with first amend-
ment protections afforded all religions.
One of the three major areas of infringement identified by
Congress was the lack of access to-sacred sites. 5 Much of this
land is federally owned and managed, but possession of the land
is only one consideration, not a controlling factor.4 6 The govern-
ment must manage that property in compliance with the man-
dates of the Constitution.
Like many world religions, many Native American religions
consider certain geographical sites as having religious and sacred
importance.47 Many of the world's religions hold places sacred,
such as the Walling Wall in Jerusalem, the Vatican in Rome,
Mecca, and cemeteries. Native American first amendment claims
involving land, nevertheless, are difficult when the court balances
a particular religion. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 n.22 (1972). See also
Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975), where the Eighth Circuit held that a state
prison's hair-length regulation impermissibly infringed upon Indian plaintiff's free exer-
cise of religion. The wearing of long braided hair was found a tenet of plaintiff's religious
beliefs, and the court found that the interests advanced by the penal administration could
be served as well by "viable, less restrictive means."
43. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220-21.
44. H.R. REP. No. 1308, supra note 9, at 1.
45. Id. at 2.
46. See Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980); Badoni v. Higgin-
son, 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980).
47. See generally J. FORBES, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE PROTECTION OF NATIVE
AMERICAN PLACES OF WORSHIP AND CEMETERIES (1977); HURDY, supra note 36;
UNDERHILL, supra note 35.
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religious claims against purported governmental interests justify-
ing use of the land. Both the courts and Congress have
acknowledged there are some Native American religions whose
beliefs and practices may be totally dependent upon a particular
geographic location."8 Hopi Tribe v. Block, however, illustrates
the difficulty courts have in understanding the essential role that
land and particular locations play in certain Native American
religions. 9
The area of the San Francisco Peaks, at issue in Hopi, has
great historical and religious significance to the Hopi Indians. It
is one of four high points surrounding the Hopi village of Oraibi.
These high points are considered to be Cloud Houses of the
spirits of the four major clans of the Hopi which guard Oraibi1 0
The San Francisco Peaks are believed to be the home of the Kat-
cina Clan. "Katcinas" are believed to be spirits sent by the
Creator to help and guide the other clans down the road of life.
The Hopi Indians have resided in the area of the Peaks since at
least the mid-twelfth century, at which time the parental village
of Oraibi was settled. It has been continuously inhabited ever
since." The Hopi way of life is deeply religious. It is based upon
a plan of World creation and travel down the road of life requir-
ing observation of the tenets of the Hopi religion.52 The values
and beliefs are expressed through an intricate annual cycle of
48. Although denying plaintiff's claims concerning the religious importance of the
particular areas at issue, the court recognized that some "particular geographic locations
figure more prominently in Indian religions and culture" than in most other religions. Se-
quoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980). See also H.R. REP., supra note 9, at
2; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9 (traditional religious rites and ceremonies of some
Native American religions may require performance at a particular place, time, and man-
ner).
49. 8 I.L.R. 3073 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981), aff'd, No. 81-1912 (D.C. Cir. May 20,
1983).
50. It is believed that when the Creator destroyed the world to punish it, the few
chosen to survive because they had remained faithful were sent on four migrations across
the country uintil settling in the area of Oraibi (in Arizona). This area, surrounded by four
high points, is considered the crossroads of these migrations. Three of these points are
presently known as Navajo Mountain, Mesa Verde, and the San Francisco Peaks. F.
WATERS, BOOK OF THE HOPI 3-113 (1963).
51. See generally Titiev, The Religion of the Hopi Indians, in READER IN COM-
PARATIvE RELIGIONS, supra note 35, at 532.
52. The Hopi religion has similarities to Christian religions. The Creation parallels
Genesis in the Old Testament. This was followed, in the Hopi religion, by the Three
Worlds, which were each subsequently destroyed by the Creator when the people fell
away from their religious ways. It is presently the Fourth World and Hopi ceremonialism
is important in much the same way that the Bible is to Christian religions to guide daily




ceremonies that pervade every aspect of Hopi life. The purpose
of these religious ceremonies is to preserve the knowledge given
by the Creator upon the emergence of the people from Mother
Earth and to carry out the plan of creation."
Upon emergence, the Hopi first settled the village of Oraibi.
The various clans then settled into their own villages in the area
surrounding Oraibi. While there is a similar pattern to the cycle
of Hopi ceremonies, each village carries on its own independent
cycle based upon ceremonies that have been entrusted to the care
of the different clans.
The Katcina Clan, believed to inhabit the San Francisco Peaks,
was unlike the other people who emerged. As spirits merely tak-
ing the forms of humans, the katcinas are believed to be the
guides and teachers of the history and meaning of the creation,
much like the disciples of Christ. They are more than mere ob-
jects in the ceremonies. They are participants who help dramatize
the values and beliefs of both Hopi religion and culture.5"
The ceremonial cycle has greatly diminished over the years. A
significant contributing factor was contacts with non-Indians and
their efforts to christianize the Indians. Government policies of
assimilation, allotment, and termination also took their toll on
the Hopi religion and culture. Despite these obstacles, the Hopi
religion and the annual cycle of ceremonies is still practiced.
There is no question that the belief of the sacredness of the
Peaks is founded in the Hopi religion and that this belief is
sincere. Applying the factors set out in Wisconsin v. Yoder,"
there is ample history relating the nature of the religion and the
role of the Peaks as home of the katcinas. The participation of
the katcinas in the Hopi religion is also an integral part of the
religious ceremonial cycle-"central" to the exercise of the Hopi
religion.
In denying the Hopi plaintiffs' claim to remove the facilities,
53. As the Creator destroyed each of the first three worlds, the faithful were pro-
tected inside the earth. The earth is believed to be a living entity-Mother Earth-the
"womb" from which the faithful were "born" (emerged). The Creator then sent katcinas
to guide the people on their migrations to the land chosen for settlement in and around
the village of Oraibi. The premise of the Hopi ceremonialism is that it will carry out the
plan of the creation by someday unifying all the Hopi clans in their homeland around
Oraibi. Id. at 3-112, 122-250. See also M. TITIEV, THE Hopi INDIANS OF OLD ORAIBI:
CHANGE AND CONTiNuITY 255-83 (1972).
54. The importance of the Katcina Clan, according to Hopi prophesy, is such that
when all else is forgotten and gone, the katcina dances will be the last of Hopi rituals to
go. WATERS, supra note 50, at 67-71, 122-250.
55. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
19821
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the court pointed out that the Hopi (and the Navajo) have con-
tinued to practice their religions despite the existence of the
facilities; they have not been prohibited from exercising their
religious beliefs in other areas of the Peaks.5 6 The court discussed
the plaintiffs' request to enjoin further development under the
first amendment separately from their claim under the Act. All
agreed that the three duties created by the Act were complied
with by the federal agencies involved." In light of the purpose of
the Act, however, the court failed to give the identified religious
interests their proper consideration under the first amendment
balancing test.
The Act is a remedial measure to assure equal consideration
and protection of traditional Native American religious rights
under the first amendment. The Act does not mandate that
Native American religious claims always prevail. 8 It does
recognize the right to the same consideration as other religions
when balancing against the government's asserted interests under
the first amendment."
In deference to the remedial nature of the Act, the court
should have given greater weight to the sacred beliefs of the Hopi
concerning the Peaks. The court stated that the government has
neither forced the plaintiffs to take on other religious beliefs in
conflict with their own, nor choose between their beliefs and
some public benefit.60 The Hopis believe the Peaks to be the
home of the katcinas-the spirits that play a central role in the
Hopi religion-and thus the role of the Peaks in the history and
nature of the Hopi religion makes the area highly sacred. Any
development that resulted in the destruction of the Peaks as a
home of the katcinas would be analogous to the destruction of an
institution representing a Christian religion. If the land on which
a church or a temple is located is seized under the doctrine of'
eminent domain, however, that church or temple may be rebuilt
elsewhere. This is not possible where the land itself is the "in-
stitution." If such an institution is destroyed, there is the serious
threat of destroying the religious beliefs that are the basis of the
Hopi religion, in effect, forcing them to abandon their religious
56. Hopi v. Block, 8 I.L.R. 3073, 3075 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981), aff'd No. 81-1912
(D.C. Cir. May 20, 1983).
57. Id. at 3076.
58. Id. at 3074.
59. TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 13.
60. Hopi v. Block, 8 I.L.R. 3073, 3074 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981), aff'd, No. 81-1912
(D.C. Cir. May 20, 1983).
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beliefs. Moreover, the interests with which these constitutionally
protected beliefs must compete are not something of such vast
public interest as, for example, a reservoir that might provide
water to a large, arid area of land.6 The development at issue in
Hopi is a recreational facility. Surely the great value this nation
places on the free exercise of religion-a right fundamental to the
founding of this country-should be given more weight when
balanced against mere recreational development.
The government also asserted in Hopi that granting plaintiffs'
relief would violate the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment. 2 This argument is often asserted to reject traditional
Native American free exercise claims. 63 The government, in
managing federal properties, must be able to "accommodate our
idiosyncrasies, religious as well as secular, to the compromises
necessary in communal life."" However, doesn't the balancing
test of the first amendment free exercise clause incorporate con-
sideration of less burdensome alternatives? Since Sherbert v.
Verner,6 the Court has appeared to interpret the first amendment
balancing test as requiring the government to accommodate
religious practices by creating exceptions to policies which in-
fringe. 66
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court spoke strongly of
the need to preserve the "doctrinal flexibility" of the first amend-
ment and apply the religion clauses sensibly and realistically to
guarantee protected religious freedoms. 67  The Court weighed
61. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980).
62. Hopi v. Block, 8 I.L.R. 3073, 3075 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981), aff'd No. 81-1912
(D.C. Cir. May 20, 1983).
63. The government sought conviction under state laws forbidding the hunting of
certain wild animals out of season, which included the moose Athabascan defendants
killed for their ceremony. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Alaska 1979). See also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 n.22 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
409-10 (1963). But compare Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980) (re-
jected idea of creating exception to accommodate need for complete privacy in ceremony
asserted by Navajo because found no legal basis to guarantee such privacy under the first
amendment).
64. Otten v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 205 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1952), quoted in Badoni v.
Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980).
65. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
66. Id.
67. Exception developed for the secondary education of Amish children could pre-
vent "the danger to the continued existence of an ancient religious faith." And the crea-
tion of such exceptions should not be avoided even where other alternatives might be
developed, but at great sacrifice to the exercise of religious freedoms protected by the first
amendment. 406 U.S. at 218 n.9.
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both the interests asserted by the state of Wisconsin and the
burden of permitting an exception to the statute to accommodate
the Amish religious beliefs. It held that such an exception should
be made to protect the Amish way of life, founded on religious
beliefs different from the majority of contemporary society."8 It
is diversities such as these that are expounded as contributing to
the greatness of this country.
The Congress has also suggested, with regard to the access of
Native Americans to sacred sites, that there should be no reason
why regulations and enforcement policies could not be revised to
allow access for religious purposes without contradicting the in-
tent of the laws."9 Such accommodation of religious freedoms
does not necessarily constitute an establishment of traditional
Native American religions over other religions in violation of the
establishment clause. The courts, the Congress, and the state
legislatures have demonstrated that apparent conflicts between
the laws and Native American religions can be resolved without
any such violation.70
The first amendment balancing test, as applied by the Court, is
designed to weigh all the interests asserted and possible accom-
modations to protect first amendment religious freedoms. In light
of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act and case law, the
Hopi court should have properly considered fashioning an alter-
native to assure that further development would not permanently
destroy the nature of the Peaks as a spiritual home of the kat-
cinas-a clear threat to the continued existence of the Hopi reli-
gion. One possible solution could be the setting aside of part of
the Peaks, by the Department of Agriculture as managing agency
of the facilities, to remain the undisturbed "home" of the kat-
cinas.
Conclusion
Freedom of religion is one of the most fundamental rights
68. Id. at 216-17.
69. 123 CONG. REC. 539300, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (remarks by Sen Abourezk,
sponsor of American Indian Religious Freedom Act). See also H.R. REP. 1308, supra
note 9.
70. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Court held it was the duty of the
state to accommodate the Saturday Sabbath of plaintiff under state unemployment com-
pensation law in light of first amendment religious freedom guarantees); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 69 (1964); Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668a (1940) (exception to accom-
modate Native American religions without violating establishment clause expressly
authorizes use of bald eagle feathers for bona fide religious purposes of Indian tribes).
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guaranteed by the religion clauses of the first amendment. Yet,
the histories of both the legislatures and the judiciary clearly
demonstrate the need to understand traditional Native American
religions. It requires a conscious effort to redefine our concepts
of what religion is to assure that traditional Native American
religions receive the same recognition and protection accorded
other religions under the first amendment.
A great variety of religious beliefs are adhered to in this coun-
try, and many of them would be perceived as irreligious to other
parts of the world. Our courts have, however, time and again
demonstrated their ability to recognize bona fide religious beliefs
and practices deserving protection under the first amendment."
Traditional Native American religions should not be denied the
same consideration simply because they too are different. As the
California Supreme Court stated:
In a mass society, which presses at every point toward con-
formity, the protection of self-expression, however unique, of
the individual and the group becomes ever more important.
The varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the
mainstream of our national life give it depth and beauty. We
preserve a greater value than an ancient tradition when we
protect the rights of Indians who honestly practice an old reli-
72gion. ....
Religious freedom is guaranteed to all religions under the first
amendment. Congress, however, perceived the need to enact a
bill directing federal agencies to bring their policies and pro-
cedures into compliance with the first amendment as those
policies applied to traditional Native American religions. It
specifically identified the history of infringements on these first
amendment freedoms which needed to be remedied. While con-
ceding that the Act applied only to federal agencies, Senator
Abourezk, as sponsor of the bill, believed that eventually it
would be realized that Congress was saying that it would not
tolerate restrictions of anybody's religious freedom, including In-
dian religious freedom. 71
The Act cannot mandate that traditional Native American
71. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1968); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
72. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727, 394 P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77
(1964).
73. American Indian Religious Freedom Act: Hearings on S.J. Res. 102 Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1977) (remarks of Sen.
Abourezk).
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religions be given greater consideration. However, when con-
sidering first amendment free exercise claims of these religions,
the traditional first amendment test should be applied in light of
this remedial legislation. By this Act federal agencies should be
on notice that they are to give traditional Native American reli-
gions their proper consideration when balanced against any pur-
ported interests of the government justifying an infringement of
religious freedoms.
Traditional Native American religious interests should not be
denied their proper weight on the basis of potentially violating
the establishment clause. Numerous legislative and judicial ex-
amples can be found to show that such conflicts between Native
American first amendment rights and various laws and regula-
tions can be resolved and still be in compliance with both of the
religion clauses. It is a delicate line between the interests that the
establishment and the free exercise clauses seek to preserve. Not
all conflicts will have a workable resolution. Where possible, the
development of workable exceptions may involve both adminis-
trative and enforcement problems, as well as the need to change
some of the policies of the agencies involved. The Act not only
contemplated this but specifically mandated that such changes
take place if necessary to comply with the first amendment. These
exceptions must be made to accommodate the highly valued reli-
gious freedoms of the first amendment. If sufficient and sincere
consideration is given to all the interests involved, the protection
of traditional Native American religious beliefs can be achieved
without rising to the level of an establishment of a state religion.
It will merely be fulfilling the government's constitutional obliga-
tion to assure the same protection to all religions under the first
amendment.
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